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Abstract
Hot spot policing is a popular policing strategy that addresses crime by assigning limited
police resources to areas where crimes are more highly concentrated. We evaluate this
strategy using a game theoretic approach. The main argument against focusing police
resources on hot spots is that it would simply displace criminal activity from one area
to another. We provide new insights on the nature of the displacement e¤ect with useful
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1 Introduction
Crime mapping is a powerful tool used by analysts in law enforcement agencies to visualize
and study crime patterns. Such maps indicate that crimes are often not evenly distributed
across geographic locations. Instead, clusters of crimes occur in specic areas, or hot spots.
Hot spot policing is a place-based strategy that attempts to reduce crime by assigning limited
police resources to places where crimes are more highly concentrated. This approach to crime
prevention is relatively new and many crime experts argue it is one of the main reasons why
New York City has achieved a dramatic decrease in crimes during the past two decades.1 We
evaluate this policy via a game theoretic approach and propose alternative strategies that
display interesting features in terms of geographic spillovers of crime reduction. Our results
o¤er useful hints to guide further empirical research.
The model we develop to study the e¤ectiveness of hot spot policing incorporates various
crime theories that capture di¤erent aspects of crime decisions. These theories have been so
far studied in isolation and, by combining them in a single model, we are able to make predic-
tions that are more consistent with observed patterns of crimes. Specically, our approach is
based on the rational choice model and uses game theory to incorporate strategic interactions
among potential o¤enders into the analysis. We also borrow from the theory of environmental
criminology, which highlights the role of spatial factors in the choice of crime location. More
formally, we propose a two-stage game. We rst divide the region under study into a nite
number of areas that di¤er in terms of attractiveness for potential o¤enders. For instance,
if the overall region represents NY City, then an area may correspond to one of its neigh-
borhoods. We capture crime attractiveness via two attributes, namely, risk of apprehension
and potential productivity. The riskiness of a place for a potential o¤ender can be thought of
as an index function that captures structural factors a¤ecting the successful apprehension of
o¤enders in that location, such as the presence of illumination or video cameras. The second
attribute, potential productivity, relates to the expected gains from committing a crime in
that place, such as the presence of a shopping mall or a bank. In the rst period of the
two-stage game, the enforcement agency decides how to allocate the limited police resources
across alternative areas. In the second period, upon observing police allocation, people decide
1See, e.g., Zimring (2011).
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whether to commit a crime and, in case of doing so, where to perform the criminal act.
Using the standard backward induction principle we solve the game by rst modeling
peoples choices for a given police assignment. Given the strategic interactions in crime
decisions, this stage of the game is itself a game among potential o¤enders. The rst part
of our work sheds light on one of the most controversial issues associated with hot
spot policing, namely, the displacement e¤ect. That is, the possibility that redirecting
police resources to hot spots would simply displace criminal activity from one area to another.2
Empirical research has found some evidence against this argument (see, e.g., Braga (2008)).
The model we provide features this empirical observation when the value of the outside option
(not to commit a crime) does not depend on the number of people who opt not to become a
criminal. Under this circumstance, the value of the outside option regulates peoples utilities,
and increasing resources in an area simply discourages people in that area from committing
a crime. Alternatively, when the outside option displays congestion e¤ects, increasing police
resources in a given area pushes some criminals from this area to the others. Congestion
e¤ects in the outside option might occur if, for instance, an increment in the number of
people searching for a legal job pushes salaries down or increases unemployment, thereby
making this outside option less attractive. The last result raises a simultaneity issue in
the empirical studies that address the e¤ect of police levels on crime reduction by using
cross-sectional data. Specically, the crime rate in each area depends not only on the police
resources allocated to that specic location, but on the whole vector of police allocation.
After we characterize the decisions of potential o¤enders, we go back to the rst stage of
the game and contrast the behavior of an enforcement agency that aims to reduce the overall
crime rate with the one of a public authority that wants to reduce crime di¤erences across
areas. We interpret the latter as an extreme implementation of hot spot policing. We nd that
the optimal police allocation does not necessarily induce an even distribution of crimes across
areas. In other words, though areas that are a priori more attractive to o¤enders (i.e., display
a larger productivity-to-risk ratio) receive indeed more police attention, the extra e¤orts in
these areas do not fully o¤set the impact of their initial structural di¤erences. Thus, in our
model, some hot spots remain under the optimal allocation strategy. This result is
2Reppeto (1976) o¤ers an early discussion on di¤erent types of displacement e¤ects in the criminal activity.
Ellen, Lacoe, and Sharygin (2013) studies displacement of crimes due to foreclosures.
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robust to all the extensions we consider for our initial model. In particular, it remains valid
independently of the displacement e¤ects. Regarding the opportunity cost of the egalitarian
policy, we nd that it increases with the variability of the productivity-to-risk ratio across
locations.
We then study an alternative place-based strategy. Specically, we analyze the implica-
tions of introducing structural changes that aim to reduce the productivity-to-risk ratio of a
certain area. This policy has been suggested by a number of crime theorists, including Braga
and Wisburd (2010), who state that:
"The attributes of a place are viewed as key factors in explaining clusters of criminal
events... To reduce and better manage problems at crime hot spots, the police need to change
the underlying conditions, situations, and dynamics that make them attractive to criminals
and disorderly persons."
We nd that this policy reduces crime not only in the target area but also in all other locations.
Positive (or negative) external e¤ects of structural changes have been proposed earlier (see,
e.g., Ehrlich (1973) and Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008)). An interesting aspect of our result is the
mechanism that produces this outcome. The direct e¤ect of the policy is to make the target
area less attractive for potential o¤enders, thereby reducing its criminal activity. The indirect
e¤ect is due to subsequent police reallocation from the improved area to the other ones, where
the criminal activity diminishes as well. In other words, structural improvements in an
area generate geographic spillovers of crime reduction in all other locations via
optimal police reallocation.
We nally consider various extensions to our initial model. The outside option people face
(not to commit a crime) can be interpreted as the possibility to get a legal job. We introduce
alternative specications of the outside option and study the e¤ects of improvements in the job
market on the proportion of people who opt not to commit a crime, e.g., the labor supply of
the economy.3 We also investigate the consequences of reversing the interaction e¤ects among
potential o¤enders. We show that, when interactions are positive as in Freeman, Grogger,
and Sonstelie (1996) and Sah (1991) interventions become a delicate matter. The reason is
3Our theoretical results are consistent with empirical ndings. See, for instance, Imrohoroglu, Merlo, and
Rupert (2004).
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that these models often display multiple equilibria and policy interventions can easily a¤ect
equilibrium selection (see Blume (2006)). We explore this possibility with a simple example.
Literature Review
Our research contributes to work in both criminal studies and economics. In an early study,
Becker (1968) examines individual decisions to commit crimes from an economic perspective.4
His cost-benet analysis is consistent with the rational choice approach used by Cornish and
Clarke (1986), which we follow as well.5 Our study also relates to subsequent work on the
importance of social interactions in motivating criminal behavior (see, e.g., Ballester, Calvo-
Armengol, and Zenou (2003, 2006), Chen and Shapiro (2007), Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie
(1996), Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996), and Sah (1991)). Following the latter, we
assume that each individual decision depends on other peoples criminal choices. In order to
incorporate spatial factors into the analysis, we model peoples expected payo¤s as in Hugie
and Dill (1994), who study habitat selection by modeling the behavior of predators and prey
(see also Helsley and Zenou (2013)).
Our work is also related to Espejo, Huillier, and Weber (2011), who provide an evaluation
of hot spot policing by using a leader and follower model, as we do in this investigation.
However, our aim and approach di¤er from theirs. Specically, we want to characterize crime
displacement in a simple (and testable) way in order to provide new insights to guide further
empirical research. In this study, we assume that people observe the police allocation and
make subsequent choices regarding criminal decisions and locations. Laezar (2006) shows
that it may be optimal, under precise circumstances, to keep police allocation secret. Though
our model is quite di¤erent from his for instance, we introduce social interactions it is
important to remark that our results remain unchanged if we allow for randomized police
allocations. The reason is that the e¤ect of police enters peoples utilities in a linear fashion.
It would be interesting to study the advantages of secret police allocation in a model similar
to the one of Laezar (2006) but with the additional feature of social interactions. We leave
4See also Ehrlich (1973).
5Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2010) provide a general description of criminal choices at the individual
level to understand the implicit assumptions in aggregate crime regressions. They highlight the relevance of
modeling the microfoundations of the empirical analysis of crimes.
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this analysis for future research.
Braga and Wisburd (2010) o¤er a deep analysis of place-based policies to crime ghting.6
In addition to new interesting insights about hot spots and crime prevention, they provide a
thorough and updated overview of the theoretical and empirical research regarding this topic.
Our theoretical modeling assumptions are inspired by all their discussions and the literature
therein, and the implications we derive are consistent with the empirical ndings they describe.
On the applied side of the literature, Fu and Wolpin (2013) perform a structural estimation
of the e¤ects of police reallocation on crime reduction. Their model does not contemplate
the possibility of displacement of criminal activity, which is one of the main aspects of our
analysis. Our theoretical results provide some justication to their modeling assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our model. Section 3
presents our main ndings. Section 4 evaluates the decision of an enforcement agency that
aims to reduce crime by changing the attributes of a certain area. Section 5 discusses three
extensions of our model. Section 6 concludes. We collect all proofs in the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Main Variables
This subsection describes the main variables of our model, making a clear distinction between
the features that we assume are exogenous to the incumbents (i.e., people and the enforcement
agency) and those that are under their control. Sections 4 and 5 examine some extensions to
this initial model structure.
Exogenous Variables We let N and M represent the size of the mass of people and police,
respectively. There are K alternative areas where criminal activity can take place. With only
a slight abuse of notation, K represents the set as well as the number of locations. These
areas di¤er with respect to three attributes, namely, size of the area, risk of apprehension,
and productivity of the criminal activity.
Sk refers to the geographic size of Area k (e.g., in square feet). Riskiness Rk is a probability
6See also Braga (2008), Eck et al. (2005), Felson and Clarke (1998), Sherman (1995), and Weisburd and
Green (1995).
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measure of the successful apprehension of o¤enders in Area k. Di¤erences in riskiness across
areas capture di¤erent characteristics of the areas that reect the level of police search activity
or the ability of police to capture o¤enders. For example, better lighting may increase the
risk of apprehension as o¤enders are more likely to be seen by someone who might call the
police. Conversely, the presence of nearby highways may reduce this risk, as it becomes easier
for criminals to escape. We use f to indicate the fee an o¤ender must pay if apprehended.
The fee (f) could capture, for instance, the opportunity cost of time spent in prison.
Productivity Ak captures the richness of the area in terms of expected benets to criminals.
For example, a rich area may be a neighborhood that is populated by high-income people
whose houses contain high-value items. It may also be a location with stores or banks available
as potential targets.
Endogenous Variables The incumbents in the model are the people and the law enforcement
agency. Specically, people decide whether to commit a crime and, if they do so, where to
perform the criminal act. In our model, pk represents the fraction of people in N who decide
to commit a crime in location k. We indicate the density of o¤enders in that location by
dk = pkN=Sk.
The enforcement agency decides how to assign police resources to di¤erent areas. We let
qk denote the fraction of police resources in M that is assigned to location k; consequently
ek = qkM=Sk is the corresponding police density. We assume M=Sk  1, for all k 2 K, so
that the per capita apprehension rate (dened below) lies between 0 and 1.
2.2 Payo¤s of People
We model encounters between police and o¤enders as a random process, such that the overall
rate of apprehension in location k is given by
A (k; pk; qk) = dkekRkSk:
Furthermore, the per capita apprehension rate of an o¤ender in location k is represented by
P (k; pk; qk) = A (k; pk; qk) =dkSk = Rkek:
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It follows from the last two expressions that the expected penalty for a person who commits
a crime is
P (k; pk; ek) f:
Thus, the cost-side of each individuals analysis depends on both his perceived probability of
being apprehended and the penalty he would have to pay in that case.7 (In Sub-section 5.2,
we allow for congestion e¤ects in the cost-side of the crime decision. These congestion e¤ects
can be motivated by the fact that a police o¢ cer cannot be at two places at the same time;
thus, as the criminal activity in a certain area increases the probability of being apprehended
in that area shifts down.)
On the other hand, the o¤enders expected benet of committing a crime is
Y (k; pk; qk) = Ak=dk:
It follows that the expected payo¤ of the criminal act increases with the productivity of the
area; by contrast, it decreases with the number of o¤enders in the area, as the total potential
productivity has to be shared among more people.
Thus, the overall expected utility of an o¤ender in location k is given by
U (k; pk; qk) = Y (k; pk; qk)  P (k; pk; qk) f = Ak=dk  Rkekf:
Recall that our model allows people not to commit a crime. This outside option can be
thought of as the possibility to work in a legal activity. Under this interpretation, the number
of people who opt not to commit a crime comprises the labor supply in the economy. To
simplify the exposition, we initially assume the expected payo¤ of this outside option is 0.
We relax this restriction in Subsection 5.1 to evaluate the impact on crimes of public policies
that a¤ect the labor market in the economy. We refer to the outside option as k = 0, so that
U (0)  0 and the choice set of each person is K0  0 [K: The outcome of their decisions is
a probability vector p  (pk)k2K 2 K0 where
K0 
n
p : pk  0 and
PK
k=0 pk = 1
o
:
Thus, Np0 represents the number of people who decide not to commit a crime.
7Durlauf and Nagin (2011) suggest that increasing the perceived risk of apprehension seems to have con-
siderable deterrent e¤ects on crimes.
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2.3 Payo¤s of Police Allocation Strategies
The public authority decides how to assign the police to di¤erent locations. Specically, it
chooses q  (qk)k2K 2 K where
K 
n
q : qk  0 and
PK
k=1 qk = 1
o
:
If the purpose of the enforcement agency is to minimize the overall level of criminal activity,
then its payo¤ function is represented by
V (p) = p0  0:
In our subsequent analysis, we contrast the behavior of a public authority interested in reduc-
ing the overall crime rate to that of a public authority aiming to minimize criminality while
it keeps an even distribution of crimes across areas. The latter could be interpreted as an
extreme version of implementing hot spot policing.
2.4 Structure of the Game
We model interactions between incumbents by using a leader and follower game, with the
public authority as the leader and potential o¤enders as the followers.
In this game, the public authority rst decides how to assign police to di¤erent locations
with the objective of reducing the overall crime rate. This problem can be specied as follows
maxq
V (p) : q 2 K	 :
Upon observing the distribution of police, each person, taking as given the decisions of the
others, decides whether to commit a crime and, in that case, where to perform the criminal
act. Thus, the problem faced by each person is
maxk fU (k; pk; qk) : k 2 K0g :




The second stage of the game is itself a game among potential o¤enders. We use Nash
equilibrium as our solution concept. Given a strategy prole p, we let b(p) indicate the
best-response correspondence of an arbitrary person, that is,
b (p) =

k0 2 K0 : k0 2 argmaxk U (k; pk; qk)
	
:
It follows that p (q) 2 K0 is a Nash equilibrium if, for each k0 2 K0, we obtain
pk0 (q) > 0 if k
0 2 b (p) and pk0 (q) = 0 otherwise:
Given an initial police assignment and some beliefs regarding crime location, all people face the
same choice set and expected payo¤s. Thus, any action that is selected with a strictly positive
probability will be among the options with the highest expected value. Since people are
indi¤erent across these possibilities, we can interpret p (q) as either an asymmetric equilibrium
in pure strategies or a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (see Hugie and Dill (1994)).
To simplify notation, we dene k  (Sk)2Ak=RkMNf , for all k 2 K. We can now
describe, for each police assignment q, the distribution of criminal activity across areas.
Proposition 1 Fix some q 2 K . The proportion of the population that decides to commit
a crime in location k, for each k 2 K, is given by
pk (q) = SkAk=N [u (q) +RkqkMf=Sk] ;
with u (q)  0. Moreover, p0 (q) > 0 if and only if
P
k2K k=qk < 1; in which case u (q) = 0.
The unique equilibrium is globally evolutionary stable.
Remark u (q) is the utility level obtained by each person at the second-stage equilibrium
when the police assignment is q. In addition, requiring
P




2Ak=RkNfqk: Thus, in our model, some people will opt not to
commit a crime (p0 (q) > 0) only if the mass of police is large enough. This scenario is
consistent with observed crime behavior.
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Proposition 1 shows that the criminal activity in a certain location increases with the
perceived productivity of the area and decreases with both its apprehension risk and the
number of police o¢ cers in place. This proposition allows us to determine the patterns of
displacement of criminal activity across locations as the public authority changes the initial
police allocation. We elaborate next on this description.
Displacement Let Q  q 2 K :Pk2K k=qk < 1	 and assume this set is non-empty.8
For all q 2 Q and all k 2 K, we get U (k; pk (q) ; qk) = 0 and pk (q) = k=qk: That is, when
the mass of police is large enough, the outside option (not to commit a crime) regulates the
second-stage equilibrium payo¤s of potential o¤enders, and the level of criminal activity in
each area depends only on the amount of police assigned to that specic area (rather than
on the whole vector of police allocation). This means that, if qk increases, then location k
becomes less attractive to potential o¤enders and its criminal activity decreases. Increasing
qk in and of itself does not induce any initial displacement of criminality from Area k to the
other areas. However, we do observe an increase in crime in other areas due to the removal of
police from the latter. In other words, the displacement e¤ect occurs in our model because,
in order to increase the police force in Area k, the law enforcement agency has to reduce it in
other areas, which then experience an increase in crime rates. This displacement mechanism
changes when the outside option displays congestion e¤ects. We evaluate this possibility
in Subsection 5.2 and state an important implication of this alternative specication for the
econometric analysis of the e¤ect of police on criminal activity. 
As mentioned before, the literature on criminality denes a hot spot as an area with
above-average level of crime relative to the entire space. Assuming p0 (q) > 0, we get from




Thus, in our model, whether Area k is a hot spot depends on both the productivity-to-risk
ratio of the area and its density of police. Sherman (1995) writes
"Drake Place was a "hot spot" of crime. It was so hot that the police said they stayed
away from it as much as possible, unless they got a call."
8 It can be easily shown that Q is a convex set.
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The structural characterization of hot spots we o¤er revises the causality of this expression.
The next section evaluates e¢ cient and egalitarian police allocations.
3.2 E¢ cient and Egalitarian Police Assignments
The last subsection described the behavior of potential o¤enders given di¤erent police assign-
ments. Using this result, we now characterize the optimal distribution of police (q  (qk)k2K)
for a public authority whose goal is to reduce the overall rate of criminal activity. We then
compare the optimal policy with one that targets hot spots until they disappear.






















=Nf is the minimum mass of police such that p0 > 0:
We assume M > M as, otherwise, the problem of the enforcement agency is trivial.
Proposition 2 indicates that the optimal amount of police in each area depends on both
the productivity-to-risk ratio and the size of the area. This proposition also implies that, at








That is, though the public authority makes a greater e¤ort in areas that are a priori more
attractive to o¤enders, this extra e¤ort is not enough to eliminate the e¤ects of their initial
attribute di¤erences. Therefore, areas that are a priori more attractive remain so in an e¢ cient
police allocation. In other words, our model contains hot spots as an equilibrium outcome.







We next examine the case in which the goal of the enforcement agency is to obtain an
even distribution of criminal activity across all areas (i.e., dk = d

l for all k; l 2 K). To this
end, we assume that the available mass of police is large enough to induce some people to







=Nf: Under this assumption, we obtain the following specication, for
each k 2 K,
qk = (k=Sk) =
P
k2K (k=Sk) :
Comparing this egalitarian policy with the e¢ cient allocation strategy, we obtain
ek =e










whenever (Ak=Rk) > (Al=Rl). That is, the egalitarian approach targets areas that are a
priori more attractive to o¤enders more intensively than does a public authority who aims to
reduce overall crime levels. This leads to our next proposition.
Proposition 3 (Opportunity Cost of Egalitarian Policy) Let M > M 0: The opportu-
nity cost of equity in terms of overall crime levels is given by









Proposition 3 indicates that the opportunity cost (in terms of criminal activity) of imple-
menting an extreme hot spot policing strategy increases with the variability of the productivity-
to-risk ratio across locations.
The next example illustrates our results so far and anticipates the analysis in the next
section.
Example 1: Let K = f1; 2g, A1 = 8, A2 = 4, R1 = 1, R2 = 2, S1 = S2 = 1; f = 1 and
NM > 20. Thus, Area 1 is both more productive and less risky than Area 2. Furthermore,
U (1; p1; q1) = 8=Np1  Mq1 and U (2; p2; q2) = 4=Np2   2Mq2:
Given that MN > 20, by Proposition 1, the e¢ cient policy solves
maxq1;q2 f1  (1=q1 + 2=q2) : 0  q1  1; 0  q2  1; q1 + q2 = 1g (1)
with 1 = 8=MN and 2 = 2=MN . Figure 1 exhibits a graphical representation of this result.
In this gure, the constraint set is denoted by the bold line. The two curves can be thought
of as di¤erent indi¤erence curves: each displays combinations of q1 and q2 that induce the
same level of criminal activity and higher indi¤erence curves are associated with lower crime
levels.
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Figure 1: E¢ cient versus Egalitarian Police Allocation Strategies
We dene an e¢ cient allocation as one that occurs whenever the marginal e¢ cacy of





Using the fact that q1 + q2 = 1, we get q1 = 2=3 and q2 = 1=3. This police assignment
corresponds to the upper-left intersection in Figure 1. Under this allocation, p1 = 12=NM >
6=NM = p2, meaning that Area 1 is a hot spot at equilibrium.
In contrast to the e¢ cient allocation strategy, the egalitarian policy satises the following
condition:
q2 = (1=2) q1:
Using the constraint, we obtain q1 = 4=5 and q2 = 1=5. This police assignment corresponds
to the lower-right intersection in Figure 1. Note that these two intersections coincide if only if
1 = 2. Under the egalitarian allocation, p1 = p2 = 10=NM . Thus, by construction, there
are no remaining hot spots. However, as Figure 1 shows, the egalitarian allocation is on a
lower indi¤erence curve. The opportunity cost of this policy in terms of crime level is 2=NM .
Note that, if we increase either the penalty in case of being caught (f) or the amount of
police (M), then both 1 and 2 decrease by the same percentage. Thus, while in these two
scenarios the police allocation remains the same, the indi¤erence curves get re-leveled with the
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induced criminal activity curves shifting downward. Alternatively, if we reduce 1 by reducing
productivity (A1) and/or increasing riskiness (R1), then the criminal activity shifts downward
by 1=q1 (this follows by applying the envelope theorem to expression (1)). This change attens
the indi¤erence curves, so that now both the e¢ cient and the egalitarian allocations entail
a lower q1 and a higher q2. This means that structural changes in Area 1 have benecial
spillover e¤ects on crime levels in Area 2 via subsequent police reallocation. The discussion
in the next section elaborates on this argument. 
4 Modifying the Attributes of the Areas
This section extends our model to consider an enforcement agency that aims to change the
characteristics of places that give rise to criminal opportunities while sustaining an optimal
police allocation. Specically, we are interested in two questions: (i) What is the e¤ect of
changing the attributes of an area on the overall rate of criminal activity? and (ii) What is
the impact on the criminal level of the areas not directly beneted by such a policy?
The question of how to best ght crime has received both academic and practical con-
sideration. For example, Braga and Wisburd (2010) state that the aim of place-based policy
strategies should go beyond hot spot policing. In their own words
"We should solve the conditions and situations that give rise to the criminal opportunities
that sustain high-activity crime places."
Similarly, public authorities have instrumented a number of area changes to increase apprehen-
sion risk or decrease productivity potential. These measures include, for instance, improving
the lighting in dark areas or inking store merchandise.
To illustrate such initiatives, notice that by Proposition 1 (assumingM > M) the problem









Note that lowering the productivity-to-risk ratio in Area k is similar to decreasing k: By
applying the envelope theorem on (2), we then obtain
@p0=@ ( k) = 1=qk:
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Thus, slightly reducing k increases the number of people who opt not to commit a crime by
1=qk. We next elaborate on the mechanism by which this change happens.
Specically, there are two forces behind the last result that reinforce each other. First, the
target area becomes less attractive to potential o¤enders and, therefore, its criminal activity
naturally diminishes. Second, by using Proposition 2 we get that, for each l 6= k,
@ql =@( k) = (1=2) (ql )2 =
p
lk > 0 and @p

l =@( k) =   (1=2) pl =pk < 0:
This means that the police force is optimally reallocated from Area k to the others, thereby re-
ducing the criminal activity in these areas as well. We conclude by saying that structural
changes in a certain area have benecial spillover e¤ects on all other locations via
subsequent optimal police reallocations.
5 Extensions of the Model
In this section, we consider three natural extensions of our initial framework. While the rst
two modify the way in which we model the outside option, the last one changes the nature of
the interaction e¤ects among potential o¤enders.
5.1 Outside Option and the Labor Market
In our model, the expected payo¤ of the outside option (not to commit a crime) is assumed to
be 0. This restriction simplies our exposition without changing the two main implications,
namely, the nature of the displacement of criminal activity and the characterization of hot
spots. Nevertheless, it impacts both the e¤ectiveness of the public authority in reducing
the overall crime rate and the optimal police allocation. To formalize this e¤ect, we extend
Proposition 2 with U (0)  c, so that c measures the opportunity cost of committing a crime.
This specication leads to the next result.














  ck and pk = pk=  1 + cPk2K k
where M , qk and p

k are dened as in Proposition 2.
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Proposition 4 states that a higher opportunity cost of committing a crime facilitates the
condition under which p0 (q) > 0 and reduces the level of criminality in all locations.
As we mentioned above, the outside option could be thought of as the possibility to work
in a legal activity. Under this interpretation, the number of people who opt not to commit a
crime comprises the labor supply in the economy. Thus, an increase in c could correspond,
for instance, to a decrease in the unemployment rate or an increase in the minimum wage.
Consistent with the empirical evidence, we nd that the criminal activity decreases when labor
market conditions improve. Alternatively, improvements in the attributes of areas would also
induce more potential o¤enders to choose the outside option, therefore increasing the labor
supply of the economy.
5.2 Congestion E¤ects in the Outside Option
Our previous analysis rules out the possibility of congestion e¤ects in the outside option.
However, we can imagine a simple mechanism by which the opposite is true. For instance,
when the number of people searching for a legal job increases, salaries may be pushed down or
unemployment increased, thereby making this outside option less attractive. This possibility
reduces the e¤ectiveness of the police force to ght crimes.
In this section, we incorporate congestion e¤ects in the outside option by assuming U (0; p0) 
A0=d0. Under this specication, the model does not have a closed form solution neither for
peoples choices conditional on police assignments nor for the optimal police allocation. Nev-
ertheless, it still delivers relevant information regarding both the displacement mechanism
and the characterization of hot spots at the optimal allocation of police resources. We start
by describing the implication of congestion e¤ects on the displacement mechanism.
Proposition 5 Let U (0; p0)  A0=d0 and Q 

q 2 K : qk > 0; k 2 K
	
. For all q 2 Q, all
k 2 K and all m 2 K with m 6= k, we get @pk (q) =@qk  0 and @pm (q) =@qk  0:
Proposition 5 states that increasing police resources in Area k reduces its criminal activity,
but it also increments the criminal level in all other locations. The reason is as follows: When
qk increases, location k becomes less attractive to potential o¤enders, and this pushes some
criminals to the outside option. When the value of this outside option is independent of
the number of people who decide not to commit a crime, there are no further consequences.
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However, when the outside option displays congestion e¤ects, the value of not to commit
a crime decreases, incentivizing people to commit crimes in other locations. This has the
undesired e¤ect of shifting pm (q) up in all other areas. We next describe an econometric
challenge raised by Proposition 5.
Estimates of Crime-Reducing E¤ect of Police Academics have long studied the rela-
tionship between the scale of policing and the level of criminal activity by using panel data.
The rst few studies on this issue did not nd evidence of a strong causal e¤ect of police on
crimes. As Levitt and Miles (2007) explain, one of the reasons behind such disappointing
result is that early studies did not take into account an endogeneity bias. Namely, jurisdic-
tions with higher crime rates react by hiring more police, and this response induces a positive
cross-sectional correlation between police and crimes. Marvell and Moody (1996) and Levitt
(1997) address this di¢ culty by using an approach based on Granger causality, and Lazzati
(2013) proposes a partial identication approach that relies on the use of police resources as
monotone instrumental variables.9
Proposition 5 poses a new identication challenge. Under congestion e¤ects in the outside
option, the crime rate in each area depends not only on the police resources assigned to that
location but also on the whole vector of police allocation. That is, if congestion e¤ects
prevail, then any study that uses cross-sectional data to evaluate the e¤ect of
police on crimes should implement a simultaneous equations approach. 
The next result shows that some hot spots still remain at the optimal police allocation in
the presence of congestion e¤ects in the outside option. It also states that whether an area is
a hot spot depends on its productivity-to-risk ratio in the same way as when U (0)  0:







This proposition corroborates that equilibrium hot spots are a robust feature of our model.
9See also MacCray and Chaln (2012).
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5.3 Complementarities in Criminal Activity
In the previous analysis, the game induced in the second stage displays negative interac-
tion e¤ects among potential o¤enders. We next evaluate the consequences of an alternative
specication.
The overall expected utility of an o¤ender in location k is given by
U (k; pk; qk) = Y (k; pk; qk)  P (k; pk; qk) f:
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to pk; we obtain
@U (k; pk; qk) =@pk = @Y (k; pk; qk) =@pk   (@P (k; pk; qk) =@pk) f: (3)
We expect both derivatives on the right-hand-side of (3) to be (weakly) negative. Specically,
congestion e¤ects in the rewards are expected as the higher the number of criminals in an area,
the lower the piece of the pie for each o¤ender. Congestion e¤ects in costs are also expected
since one police o¢ cer cannot be at two di¤erent places at the same time. Therefore, the
higher the number of criminals in a given area, the lower the probability that any one of them
is apprehended (Freeman, Grogger, and Sonstelie (1996) and Sah (1991)). The sign of the
total e¤ect will, thereby, depend on the relative size of these two forces. That is, for each
k 2 K,
@U (k; pk; qk) =@pk  () 0 if j@Y (k; pk; qk) =@pkj  () j@P (k; pk; qk) =@pkj f .
In our previous analysis, the second term dominates the rst one, thereby inducing a con-
gestion game among potential o¤enders. When the opposite holds, the second-stage game is
a game of strategic complements. Such games often display multiple equilibria and involve
coordination problems. In our case, all people may coordinate in the same option and police
allocation choices can easily a¤ect the selected one. The possibility that policy interventions
may a¤ect equilibrium selection is well-described by Blume (2006) for a discrimination model.
The next example applies this phenomenon to our model of crimes.
Example 2: Let K = f1; 2g, N = 1, and M = 1. We further assume that U (0)  0. In
addition,
U (1; p1; q1) = 1=p1   (q1 + 1=2) = (p1)2 and U (2; p2; q2) = 1=p2   4 (q2 + 1=2) = (p2)2 :
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In this example, Area 2 shows greater apprehension risk than Area 1 and the second stage of
the game displays strategic complementarities.
Specically, when q1 = q2 = 1=2, the second-stage game has two Nash equilibria: p (1=2; 1=2) 2
f(1; 0; 0) ; (0; 1; 0)g :While these two equilibria imply the same level of utility for people (zero),
the last one is much riskier for potential o¤enders. The reason is that the rst equilibrium
guarantees each person a payo¤ of zero independently of what other people choose. Alter-
natively, the second equilibrium gives each o¤ender a payo¤ of zero if and only if all other
people follow the equilibrium strategy and select to commit a crime in Area 1. Otherwise,
the payo¤ is negative. Thus, choosing not to commit a crime is a dominant strategy and it
is, therefore, reasonable to predict that everyone will choose this option.
Let us now assume the public authority assigns all police force to the riskier area, so that
q1 = 0 and q2 = 1: Though the equilibrium set does not change, the two predictions di¤er
regarding expected payo¤s. While the payo¤ of coordinating not to commit a crime is zero,
the payo¤ of coordinating to commit a crime in Area 1 is 1=2 for each o¤ender. Thus, it may
now be reasonable to predict that people will coordinate in the second equilibrium. 
Whether crime decisions are substitutes or complements is ultimately an empirical question
with relevant policy implications. De Paula and Tang (2012) and Aradillas-Lopez and Gandhi
(2012) provide theoretical results on identication of signs of interaction e¤ects in games.
Their work could be very useful in addressing whether crime decisions are complements or
substitutes. The answer to this fundamental question would provide relevant insights for
developing further theoretical and empirical research in the area of crimes. An alternative
approach would consist in developing policies that are robust to the alternative possibilities.
6 Final Discussion
Crime rates fell sharply in the U.S. during the 1990s, including both violent and property
crimes. In NY City the fall was so strong that the media often refers to this phenomenon as
the New York "miracle." This drop in crimes generated deep debates among crime experts
and hot spot policing appears as one of the most cited explanations.10 The main argument
10Levitt (2004) evaluates frequently cited reasons for the crime decline in articles in major newspapers over
the 1990s. He presents a list of six factors, which has innovative policing strategies at the top and increased
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against focusing police resources on hot spots is that it would simply displace criminal activity
from one area to another. We evaluate hot spot policing via a game theoretic approach with
a special emphasis on the displacement mechanism. Our characterization of the displacement
mechanism o¤ers new insights for the empirical analysis of the deterrent e¤ect of police on
crimes. We nd that, while areas that are initially more attractive for potential o¤enders
should indeed receive more police resources, some hot spots still remain at the optimal al-
location. Thus, further hot spot policing strategies should be carefully studied in terms of
ultimate objectives. We nally study alternative place-based policies that display attractive
properties in terms of geographic spillovers of crime reduction. The mechanism by which the
spillovers take place is particularly interesting: By making a target area less attractive for
potential o¤enders, the public authority directly reduces its criminal activity. The spillover
e¤ect is due to the subsequent optimal police reallocation from the improved area to the other
ones, where the criminal activity diminishes as well.
number of police as the least cited factor among the six. While he nds innovative policing strategies do not
appear to have played an important role in the drop in crime, he suggests increased number of police may have
been an important determinant.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 By Sandholm (2001), p (q) is a Nash equilibrium in the second
stage of the game if it satises the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the Lagrangian
L (p;q) = R p00 U (0) dt+Pk2K R pk" U (k; t; qk) dt+Pk2K0 'kpk +   1 Pk2K0 pk :
That is, if (p (q) ;' (q) ;  (q)) satises the following conditions:
AkSk=Npk (q) RkMfqk=Sk =  'k (q) +  (q) ; for all k 2 K;
0 =  '0 (q) +  (q)
'k (q)  0; pk (q)  0 and 'k (q) pk (q) = 0; for all k 2 K0;
 (q)  0 and  1 Pk2K0 pk (q) = 0.
It is readily veried that the non-negativity constraints are non-binding, i.e., 'k = 0; for all
k 2 K: Thus, the previous conditions reduce to
AkSk=Npk (q) RkMfqk=Sk =  (q) for all k 2 K
'0 (q) =  (q)
'0 (q)  0; p0 (q)  0 and '0 (q) p0 (q) = 0
pk (q)  0 for all k 2 K
 (q)  0 and Pk2K0 pk (q) = 1:
As a consequence, we need to consider only two cases, namely, '0 (q) > 0 and '0 (q) = 0:
We rst suppose '0 (q) > 0: Then p0 (q) = 0 and pk (q) = SkAk=N ( (q) +RkqkMf=Sk),
for all k 2 K. However, this is possible if and only if there exists  (q) > 0; such thatP
k2K pk (q) = 1. Note that
P
k2K pk (q) is decreasing in  (q) and
P
k2K pk (q) ! 0 as
 (q) ! 1: Thus, by the intermediate value theorem, this condition holds if and only ifP
k2K k=qk  1:
We now suppose '0 (q) = 0: This yields the following equation:
pk (q) = (Sk)
2Ak=NRkqkMf = k=qk;
for all k 2 K. Since p0 (q)  0, then
P
k2K k=qk  1 with strict inequality if p0 (q) > 0:
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Uniqueness follows as the potential function is strictly concave in p on K0 . Sandholm
(2010) shows that global evolutionary stability follows by the same condition. 
Proof of Proposition 2 For M large enough, any e¢ cient police allocation satises the
following condition:
U (k; pk (q) ; qk) = 0:
Thus, for all k 2 K;
pk (q) = k=qk:
The problem of the public authority can then be posed as
maxq

1 Pk2K k=qk : q 2 K	 : (4)
In equation (4), the objective function is di¤erentiable and strictly concave for all q in the
interior of K : Thus, the solution to (4) exists and is unique. Moreover, q is an equilibrium
if it satises the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the Lagrangian:
L (q) = 1 Pk2K k=qk  Pk2K 'kqk     Pk2K qk   1 :




2   'k = ; for all k 2 K;
'k  0; qk  0 and 'kqk = 0; for all k 2 K;
  0 and  1 Pk2K qk = 0.
It is readily veried that the non-negativity constraints are non-binding, i.e., 'k = 0 for all
k 2 K: The characterization of q follows through a simple calculation.




k < 1 needs to hold for p
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2  Pk2K SkPk2K k=Sk:
By applying the Multinomial Theorem to the rst term in the right hand side and expanding
the second term, the last expression takes the form of





















k;l2K;k 6=l (Sl=Sk) k:
Since k  (Sk)2Ak=RkMNf , then


















which completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4 The proof of this result is very similar to the proofs of Propositions
1 and 2, thus we omit it. 
Proof of Proposition 5 Under this specication, for all q 2 Q, people will re-distribute
across options till the utility obtained in each of them is the same. Therefore, p0 = S0A0=Nu (q)
and, for each k 2 K, we have
pk (q) = SkAk=N [u (q) +RkqkfM=Sk] (5)
where u (q) is the constant that solves
P
k2K0 pk (q) = 1: Di¤erentiating (5) pk (q) and pm (q)
with respect to qk we get
@pk (q) =@qk =  
n
SkAk=N [u (q) +RkqkfM=Sk]
2
o
[@u (q) =@qk +RkfM=Sk]
@pm (q) =@qk =  
n




By the Implicit Function Theorem applied to
P
k2K0 pk (q) = 1 we get
@u (q) =@qk =  
n












Substituting the last expression in the previous two, we obtain that @pk (q) =@qk  0 and
@pm (q) =@qk  0: 
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Proof of Proposition 6 At the second stage equilibrium, p0 = S0A0=Nu (q) : Thus, max-
imizing p0 is the same as selecting the vector q that minimizes u (q) : It follows that any
optimal q must satisfy, for all k;m 2 K,
@u (q) =@qk = @u (q) =@qk:
Using intermediate results from the proof of Proposition 5 we get that, for all k;m 2 K,
p
AkRk= [u (q) +RkqkfM=Sk] =
p
AmRm= [u (q) +RmqmfM=Sm] = H:
Thus, for each k 2 K, we have
Npk (q) =Sk = dk =
p
Am=RmH (6)
and the result follows immediately. 
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